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NOTES
and by special assignment providing more judges in district courts
of confinement, 45 the burden on these courts would still be alleviated
and the more compelling disadvantages of requiring the petitioner to
file at the sentencing court would no longer exist.
M
MARITIME CASES AND THE "FEDERAL QUESTION"
Exercise of the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
on a "federal question" basis has been vexing the judiciary ever since
the United States Supreme Court attempted to define the scope of
the constitutional grant of power in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States." Except for an abortive attempt to authorize such jurisdiction
in 1801,2 the power given Congress by Article III of the Constitution
to invest the inferior federal courts with jurisdiction to enforce rights
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States was not
exercised until the vast expansion of federal power after the Civil
War, in the Judiciary Act of 1875,3 section 1 of which is the pred-
ecessor of the present section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States
Code.4
Not the least vexatious of the problems surrounding the inter-
pretation of section 1331 has been a recent controversy r as to its
fundamental scope, and indeed as to the interpretation to be given
Article III itself. The controversy has centered around the juris-
District habeas corpus cases filed habeas corpus cases filed
1945-48 1955-58
Pennsylvania 47 34
Georgia 321 201Indiana 24 20
Kansas 314 532California 161 89Washington 116 64
15 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1958) dealing with assignment of judges would authorize
such special assignments.
19 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824).
2 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 92, repealed by Act of March 8,
1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
3 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.4 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ex-
clusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958).
5 It arose over a theory advanced in a dictum by Judge Magruder inJansson v. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212, 217 (1st Cir. 1950). Fourdays later the Third Circuit rejected the theory in Jordine v. Walling, 185
F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950).
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dictional proposition that section 1331 empowers the district courts
to entertain maritime cases on the law side 6 as cases "arising under"
the Constitution or laws. 7
The purpose of this note is to evaluate the constitutional, statu-
tory and decisional principles advanced by courts and commentators
as affecting the theoretical and practical validity of such jurisdiction.
How do maritime cases come to be put forward as arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States? Article III, section 2,
of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that: "The judicial Power
shall extend .. . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion. . . ." This power, unlike the grant over cases "arising under"
the Constitution or laws, was early implemented by the Judiciary Act
of 1789 which provided that the lower federal courts "shall have
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction, . . . saving to suitors, in all cases the right of a
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
it.... 8
The constitutional extension of the federal judicial power to
admiralty and maritime cases has also been held to adopt the general
maritime law 9 as the substantive law to be applied in such cases.' 0
Federal maritime law is to be applied rather than the common law.
even when brought in a state court via the saving to suitors clause."
The cases coming within the purview of this body of law, then, to
6 Cases heard under the direct grant over "Any civil case of admiralty
or maritime jurisdiction . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958), are tried on a sep-
arate admiralty "side" of the district court under special admiralty procedure
and without a jury.
7 As distinguished from their established power to do so when jurisdiction
is invoked because of diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
8 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789). The saving
to suitors clause is now worded: ". . saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1958).
The Reviser's Note to § 1333 explains that the new wording is simpler and
more expressive of the original intent of Congress. The new form is held
to have the same meaning as the old. Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959). See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 35 (1957).
Another inference, more logically remote, drawn from the grant of judicial
power over cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is that Congress has
the power, subject to well recognized limitations, "to alter, qualify or supple-
ment [the general maritime law] ... as experience or changing conditions
might require." Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924). It is
pursuant to this constitutional power that legislation on maritime matters
derives its validity. Ibid.
9 The general maritime law may be roughly described as that body of
usages and precepts commonly applied to maritime matters by the commer-
cial nations of the world. It is operative in any country only insofar as it is
adopted therein. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 558, 572-74 (1874).
10 E.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ; Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Chelentes v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,
247 U.S. 372 (1918) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
11 Ibid.
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the extent they are truly "federal," 12 are those presently sought to
be absorbed into the jurisdictional authority of section 1331 as cases
"arising under." 13
"Federal Question" Criteria and the General Maritime Law
Before determination of the validity of federal question jurisdic-
tion of admiralty and maritime cases is attempted in the light of those
constitutional and statutory relationships unique to the specific issue,
some of the criteria universally used to test federal question jurisdic-
tion over cases of any sort will be applied, arguendo, to maritime
cases.
Does the word "laws" in section 1331 refer to federal legislation
only? An affirmative answer to that question would preclude federal
question jurisdiction over the non-statutory 14 maritime cases such as
unseaworthiness 15 and maintenance and cure 16 as arising under the
12 There are areas of state competence in maritime law where a plaintiff's
cause of action could not be said to arise under "federal" law. See Wilburn
Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). See also Note,
State Wormiful Death Statutes as Applied in Maritime Actions, 33 ST. JoHN'S
L. REv. 355 (1959). In GILMoRE & BLAcK, ADM rALTY 386 (1957), the authors
feel that "personal injury cases are about the only ones which would come
within the federal nonadmiralty, nondiversity jurisdiction. . . ." Ibid.
13 Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952). The court found
that maritime cases arose under the Constitution since Article III adopted the
law to be applied in such cases. The possibility that they arise under the
laws of the United States was discussed in Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955).
14 Statutes dealing with maritime matters contain their own jurisdictional
provisions. See, e.g., Ship Mortgage Act, 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 951
(1952); Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761
(1952); Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1952).
The terms "maritime case" and "saving clause action" as used in this note
shall refer only to non-statutory maritime suits, unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise.
15 The warranty of seaworthiness imposes liability upon the vessel and her
owner "for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness
of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances
appurtenant to the ship." The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). The duty
is absolute and is not satisfied by the exercise of due diligence, and extends,
not only to seamen, but to a broadened class of workmen who perform ship's
work traditionally done by seamen. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85 (1946); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,
629 (1959).
16 A seaman is entitled to medical expenses (cure) and a living allowance
(maintenance) for illness or injury occurring while he is in the service of
the ship. Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
Recovery is allowable until a point of maximum cure has been reached. Farrell
v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949). The right is analogous to workmen's
compensation but is not subject to the limitations applicable to the latter.
Maintenance and cure does not bar recoveries for unseaworthiness or negli-
gence under the Jones Act, Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928),
although but a single recovery is permitted for each element of damages,
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laws of the United States. This conclusion was reached in Jordine
v. Walling,17 apparently the first case to deal extensively with the
problem in a maritime controversy.
However, it has been pointed out that cases founded on the gen-
eral maritime law are cases arising under the Constitution since
Article III itself has been held to adopt, by inference, the substantive
maritime law.' 8
The proponents of federal question jurisdiction over maritime
cases, whether the key word be Constitution or laws, must neverthe-
less contend with the technical requirements concerning the presenta-
tion of the federal claim so that it "arises under" federal law as
required by section 1331. The leading case dealing with the inter-
pretation of the phrase "cases arising under" in the Constitution is
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,'9 wherein Chief Justice Marshall
laid down a broad grant of power. His expression of the require-
ment of a "construction" of federal law necessary to a valid exercise
of federal power over federal questions did not require an actual dis-
pute between the litigants as to the meaning and effect of the law.
The fact that federal law is an "original ingredient" of a plaintiff's
claim which could give rise to such a dispute was held sufficient to
come within the grant of judicial power.2 0
Indeed, this liberal interpretation of the constitutional phrase is
necessary if the federal courts are to act within their constitutional
scope of authority when they handle litigation under legislative grants
of jurisdiction to enforce rights created by federal statutes.2 ' For in
such cases the district courts entertain suits to enforce those rights
Reardon v. California Tanker Co., 260 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1958). The phrase
"in the service of the ship" does not require a causal connection between the
illness or injury and the seaman's duties. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303
U.S. 525 (1938). Injuries received while off-duty on shore are compensible,
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943), and recovery is barred
only by the seaman's willful misconduct, Warren v. United States, 340 U.S.
523 (1951).
17 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950); accord, Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102
U.S. 135, 141 (1880) (dictum). But cf. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S.
523, 526-27 (1951) ; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts.
53 CoLt m. L. Rav. 157 (1953).
1s Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 844-45 (1st Cir. 1952).
19 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824).20 For detailed analyses of the case, see Chadbourn & Levin, Original Juris-
diction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 646-49 (1942) ; Forrester,
The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 Tug. L. REv. 362, 367-70 (1942).
21 See, e.g., 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1958). "The dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights and trademarks. Such
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent and copy-
right cases." Ibid. and 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1958). "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy." Ibid.
[ VOL.. 34
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though the dispute in a given case may be solely as to the facts, with
complete agreement as to the meaning and effect of the law.
However, with regard to the "arising under" phrase in section
1331, much dispute has arisen over the efforts of the federal courts
to restrict the volume of litigation by strict construction of the
statute.22 A requirement of controversy over the effect of the law,2 3
together with a necessity that the face of the complaint show the
federal question 24 without anticipation of defenses,25 have combined
to require the judiciary to do the logically impossible, i.e., to deter-
mine the existence of a real and substantial controversy upon the
face of the complaint.26  Nevertheless, the "construction and con-
troversy" test continues to appear in the cases.2 7  If such standards
are strictly adhered to, they would prevent any wholesale inclusion
of suits founded on the general maritime law into the jurisdiction of
section 1331, because the majority of such cases involve issues of fact
alone rather than a controversy as to the effect of the law. A standard
of "proximity," however, as stated by Mr. justice Cardozo in Gully
v. First National Bank,23 with jurisdiction accepted if a claim is predi-
cated directly and immediately on federal law, and rejected if "the
most one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in the
background," 29 would not bar the inclusion of maritime cases, for
claims based on the national maritime law are founded directly rather
than remotely on that law.
The Constitutional Grant and the Statutory Implementation
The approach taken in this section may be distinguished from
the considerations discussed in the preceding one by the observation
that, if a fundamental examination shows that cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, as a corpus, are not comprehended in the words
2 2 E.g., Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934). "The policy of the statute
calls for its strict construction." Id. at 270; accord, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672-73 (1950).
23 Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912); Shoshone Mining Co.
v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
24 The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); Joy
v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906); Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S.
48 (1904).
25 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 22; The Fair v.
Kohler Die & Specialty Co., supra note 24; Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U.S.
313, 334 (1906) ; Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
28 On the logical difficulty noted, see Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in
the District Courts, 53 COLUli. L. REv. 157, 170 (1953); Chadbourn & Levin,
Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 666 (1942).2 In Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950), the court disposed
of the argument that a maritime case "arose under the Constitution" with
the controversy and construction requirement.
28299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936).
29 Id. at 117.
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"Constitution and laws of the United States" as used in section 1331,
even a favorable outcome of the application of the technical federal
question criteria would be unavailing to bring maritime cases within
the ambit of that section.
The proposition that cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion do not fall within the grant of jurisdiction over cases "arising
under" has its origin in a concept enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall
in American Ins. Co. v. Canter,3" wherein he considered the signifi-
cance of the separate enumeration of the classes of cases to which thejudicial power was extended by Article III: "The constitution cer-
tainly contemplates these as . . . distinct classes of cases; and if they
are distinct, the grant of jurisdiction over one of them, does not confer
jurisdiction over [the others] .... The discrimination made between
them, in the constitution is, we think, conclusive against their
identity." 31
This was the accepted interpretation of Article III when the
Judiciary Act of 1875 32 was enacted.33 Thus, it logically follows
that, as a matter of legislative intent, the words of the statute, taken
as they were directly from clause 1 of Article III, 3 4 drew solely upon
the reservoir of power present in that clause and not upon the whole
of the authority of Article III.35  Concrete evidence of congressional
intent usually available from legislative histories and contemporary
comment is notable by its absence. 36 However, a consideration of
the forces that instigated the passage of the act 3 7 points to the con-
clusion that it was intended as an extension of federal power there-
tofore dormant rather than a sub silentio supplement to an already
existing admiralty jurisdiction.
Note on this point the fact that in the various legislative ex-
pansions of maritime rights, Congress, when it has desired to provide
an action at law or a jury trial, has deemed necessary a specific
authorization of such right.38
30 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511 (1828).
31 Id. at 545.
32 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. This was the predecessor
of the present 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958).
'33 Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 365-67 (1959).
.34 U.S. CosT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States. . . ." Ibid. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat 470:
"[T]he circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. . . ." Ibid.
35 Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 366-67 (1959).36 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65
(1928).
37 The act was the product of a desire of a strongly nationalistic post-
Civil War era to provide a federal forum for the protection of newly created
federal rights. See FRANxFURTEm & LANDIS, op. Cit. supra note 36, at 64-65.
as See the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952); Great
[ VOL. 34
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Against the theory of distinct classes of cases, jurisdiction over
each of which has been separately preserved, is the analogy drawn
by the case of Doucette v. Vincent. 9 The court reasoned that since
a maritime right set up in a saving clause action brought in a state
court is reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court 40 as a "right
claimed under the Constitution or statutes of the United States," 41
maritime claims should be comprehended by the similar wording of
section 1331. However, the difference in the function of the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the original jurisdiction of the
district courts 42 supports the conclusion that the language in the
certiorari statute is to be read in a more generic sense than the lan-
guage of section 1331, which draws solely from clause 1 of Article III
of the Constitution.43
Lakes Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1958). The effect of the "distinct classes of
cases" theory stated by the Court in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet.(26 U.S.) 511 (1828), and adopted by Romero v. International Term. Oper.
Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), upon the theoretical basis of the jurisdictional
provisions of the statutes cited above may be illustrated by the following
observation: The holding of Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), the
leading case in the interpretation of the Jones Act, when read in conjunction
with the "distinct classes of cases" theory affirmed by the Romero case, in-
dicates that the federal law-side jurisdictional provision of the act is grounded
solely upon the admiralty clause of Article III of the Constitution. The
Romero holding indicates, by implication, that if the Jones Act did not itself
authorize an action on the law side of the district court, § 1331 would not
operate to sustain such jurisdiction as a case arising under the laws of the
United States because, by the Romero holding, a Jones Act suit, being a case
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is not within the class of cases com-
prehended by § 1331. Conversely, the law-side jurisdictional provision of the
Jones Act would be valid under the admiralty clause of Article III even if§ 1331 did not exist; indeed this would be so if the "arising under" clause of
Article III itself did not exist.
39 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952).
40E.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). The
plaintiff lost in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because he had failed to meet
the state rule as to the burden of proof of one who asserts the invalidity
of a release. In certiorari the Supreme Court reversed, holding "the right of
the petitioner to be free from the burden of proof imposed by the Pennsylvania
local rule inhered in his cause of action. Deeply rooted in admiralty as that
right is, it was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be con-
sidered a mere incident of a form of procedure." Id. at 249.
4128 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1958).4 2 Note that a suit under § 1331 is of right while a petition for certiorari
under § 1257(3) is, of course, permissive. The Supreme Court's role as
expositor of national law is contrasted with the district court's function of
enforcement of that law in Mishkin, The Federal "Questio." in the District
Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 170 (1953).
43The court in Doucette v. Vincent, supra note 39, had for its major
premise the proposition that the content of a phrase found in two statutes is
the same in both, without regard to the differences in legal and social purpose
between the two. Such a position is in sharp contrast to that of Mr. justice
Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918). "A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
1959]
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Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.
The approach suggested by the Canter 44 case, rather than an ap-
plication of the general federal question criteria, was utilized by the
Supreme Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.
45
Plaintiff, a Spanish seaman, contended, inter alia, that his claims
against the shipowner for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure
were cognizable on the law side of the district court under section
1331. In considering federal question jurisdiction of maritime cases,
the Court recognized that such cases "arise under" the Constitution
in the sense that the Constitution is the source of power by which
the United States acts in a sovereign capacity, and wherein any ex-
ercise of judicial power must find its justification, but rejected the
application of the phrase in a jurisdictional sense.46 The Court em-
phasized the historical evidence surrounding the interpretation of
section 1331 and the problems of judicial administration that would
ensue if such jurisdiction were allowed. 47
From the viewpoint of the litigant, the Romero Court found it
doubtful that Congress intended to deprive the maritime suitor of his
historic option under the saving to suitors clause to select a state
remedy for the enforcement of his maritime right by classifying the
right as one "arising under" and hence removable to the federal
court at the option of the defendant. 48 Nor would this be the only
restriction upon the freedom of the saving clause suitor. If a saving
clause action is brought on the law side of the district court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship, venue provisions allow the action to
be brought where all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside.49 If
section 1331 were a concurrent basis of jurisdiction, the plaintiff would
be subject to the more restrictive venue provisions applicable to
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used." Id. at 425. See COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. VI (1942).
44American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511 (1828).
45 Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, rehearing denied,
359 U.S. 962 (1959).
46 Id. at 368.
47 The Court found significance in the fact that "no student of the federal
courts or of admiralty, no judge, and none of the learned and alert members
of the admiralty bar were able, for seventy-five years, to discern the drastic
change now asserted to have been contrived in admiralty jurisdiction by the
Act of 1875." Id. at 370.
48 "Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship of
the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958).
49 "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a) (1958).
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"arising under" actions. 0 It should be noted, however, that a plain-
tiff might feel the restriction of venue to be amply compensated by
the availability of a federal jury trial offered him by the proposed
jurisdiction.
From the viewpoint of the judiciary, the Romero Court felt that
the free removability of saving clause actions that would attach if
they were held within section 1331, 1 would disrupt a traditional
federal-state inter-jurisdictional relationship, "a jurisdiction which it
was the unquestioned aim of the saving clause of 1789 to preserve." 52
In addition, the typically perplexing problems of source-of-law
in maritime cases would constantly present themselves under section
1331, because jurisdiction would lie only if the governing law in a
particular case were "federal." In adverting to this question the
Romero Court remarked:
The necessity for jurisdictional determinations couched in terms of "state"
or "federal law" would destroy that salutory flexibility which enables the
courts to deal with source-of-law problems in light of the necessities illumi-
nated by the particular question to be answered. Certainly sound judicial policy
does not encourage a situation which necessitates constant adjudication of the
boundaries of state and federal competence.53
Conclulsioz
The section 1333 grant of admiralty jurisdiction is based upon
the maritime nature of the claim.5" The exclusiveness of the grant
pre-empts all jurisdiction based upon the nature of the claim. The
saving to suitors clause, being merely a permission for a suitor to
30 "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity
of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all the de-
fendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1958). See Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 215 U.S. 501(1910).51 The potential free removability of saving clause actions would seem to
be minimal in the area of personal injury cases, because such suits usually
contain a count under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688(1952), which communicates its own irremovability to counts not separate and
independent, such as unseaworthiness. Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193
F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952). An attendant count of maintenance and cure, while
independent of the others, would rarely meet the monetary minimum of $10,000
necessary for removal.52 Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372 (1959).
The competence of the states in certain admiralty matters antedates the Revo-
lution. Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. (46 U.S.) 441, 454-55 (1847). For a dis-
cussion of the jurisdiction of state courts of admiralty under the Articles of
Confederation, see 4 BENEDicr, ADMIALTY §§719-25 (6th ed. 1940).53 Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., supra note 52, at 376.
54 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958) gives to the district courts, sitting in admiralty,
"original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of: (1) Any civil
case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Ibid.
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go elsewhere for a common-law remedy,5 5 does not affect the exclu-
siveness of the Admiralty Court's jurisdiction over maritime cases,
qua maritime. The court to which the saving clause suitor goes must
bottom its jurisdiction on some ground other than the maritime nature
of the case.56 A state court of general common-law jurisdiction bases
its jurisdiction primarily on control over the parties; 57 all other mat-
ters, including the fact that the case may be a maritime one, bear
upon the issue of whether or not the complaint states a cause of
action. The district court may hear the case on the law side if juris-
diction can be based upon the diverse citizenship of the litigants. The
independent ground of jurisdiction of the state court and the district
court diversity case is apparent from the fact that, all other things
being equal, jurisdiction would still lie even if the case were not
maritime. Note that this cannot be said of the attempted assumption
of jurisdiction under section 1331; take away the fact that the case
is maritime and jurisdiction fails. It can thus be seen that the pro-
posal under consideration is an attempt to usurp that which is ex-
clusive under section 1333, viz., jurisdiction based upon the maritime
nature of the claim.
The cases that evolved the doctrine of federal primacy in mari-
time law did so in exposition of the admiralty clause of Article 11.58
They dealt solely with the problem of what substantive law should
be uniformly applied to a maritime fact situation, jurisdiction over
which had already been established.59  It is felt that the Romero
decision was a perceptive judicial rejection of a "mechanical juris-
prudence" which would lift a doctrine bodily from the context in
which it was formulated and apply it to a jurisdictional statute
divorced from those considerations that gave validity to the doctrine
in the first instance.
55"It seems clear that the 'saving to suitors' clause makes no affirmative
grant of jurisdiction but merely excepts from the exclusive admiralty or mari-
time jurisdiction of the United States District Courts all cases in which suits
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